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Can Schools Be Held Accountable 
for Good Performance?
A Critique of Common 
Educational Performance Indicators
Robert H. Meyer 
University of Chicago
Educational indicators are increasingly being used to assess the effi 
cacy of American education. Local newspapers regularly report how 
students in local schools perform on nationally standardized tests, and 
a growing number of states publish formal school report cards that pro 
vide an assortment of student outcome, enrollment, and financial indi 
cators. In April 1991, President Bush elevated the discussion of 
educational indicators to the national level with "America 2000," a 
proposal to establish a national examination system, complete with 
school district, state, and national report cards (U.S. Department of 
Education 1991).
The growing demand for educational performance indicators has 
been motivated in large part by a growing demand for public account 
ability defined in terms of hard outcomes, such as standardized test 
scores, rather than inputs, such as teacher qualifications, class size, and 
course requirements. Demands for public accountability have been 
particularly strong in states that have dramatically increased expendi 
tures on education and in states that have launched major school 
improvement efforts. The increased demand for public accountability 
in elementary and secondary education has paralleled similar demands 
for increased accountability in other public sector activities, for exam 
ple, the Job Training Partnership Act and the new JOBS program, 
enacted as part of the Family Support Act.
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Despite the groundswell of interest in data on school performance, 
many educators and scholars fear that poorly implemented perfor 
mance indicators could ultimately be worse than no indicators at all. 
These fears are not groundless. As will be discussed in this paper, per 
formance indicators based on achievement tests could be flawed in two 
major ways. First, the achievement test underlying a performance indi 
cator could be susceptible to "narrow" teaching to the test or could fail 
to reflect a school's true educational objectives. Second, a performance 
indicator constructed from a simplistic or otherwise inappropriate sta 
tistical model could fail to reflect the true contribution of a school to 
growth in measured student achievement. Under these conditions, a 
high stakes system of educational performance indicators could 
severely distort the behavior of educators and students.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the statistical adequacy of the 
most commonly used educational performance indicators. One of the 
major conclusions of the analysis is that the typical indicators used to 
assess school performance—average and median test scores—are 
highly flawed as measures of school performance. As a result, they are 
of limited value, if not useless, for evaluating relative school perfor 
mance or school performance over time. Indeed, simulation results 
indicate that changes over time in average test scores could very well 
be negatively correlated with actual changes in school performance.
The analysis also demonstrates that the typical indicators used to 
assess school performance are likely to provide schools with the per 
verse incentive to "cream," that is, to raise measured school perfor 
mance by educating only those students who tend to have high test 
scores. The potential for creaming is apt to be particularly strong in 
environments characterized by selective admissions. However, cream 
ing could also exist in more subtle, but no less harmful, forms. For 
example, schools could create an environment that is relatively unsup- 
portive for potential dropouts, academically disadvantaged students, 
and special education students, thereby encouraging these students to 
drop out or transfer to another school. Alternatively, high-quality 
teachers and administrators could gravitate to neighborhood schools 
that predominantly serve high-scoring students.
The paper is .organized in nine major sections, the first of which is 
this introduction. The second section is a discussion of the problems 
that exist with traditional standardized tests; the third presents an
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assessment of the validity of the average test score. I demonstrate that 
this commonly used indicator is highly flawed as an indicator of school 
performance. In the fourth section, I demonstrate that an alternative 
indicator, the gain indicator, avoids all but one of the major flaws asso 
ciated with the average test score. In particular, the gain indicator fails 
to measure the value-added contributions of schools to growth in aca 
demic achievement. The seventh and eighth sections draw on simu 
lated and actual data to illustrate the advantages of gain indicators over 
average summary scores. I first investigate value-added indicators, and 
then consider the consequences of evaluating schools on the basis of 
incomplete indicators. Finally, I present recommendations for the 
phased-in development of valid educational performance indicators. 
An appendix provides technical information concerning the simula 
tions reported in the fifth section.
The Problems With Traditional Standardized Tests
Many educators and testing experts believe that there is a great need 
for new and improved ways of testing student achievement. A major 
problem with national standardized tests is that they are designed to 
appeal to all schools regardless of their educational objectives. These 
tests, if used in a high stakes indicator system, could drive teachers and 
administrators to focus almost exclusively on low-level academic con 
tent (Smith and O'Day 1990; Clune 1991). The achievement tests used 
as the basis for a performance indicator system should ideally reflect a 
balance of low- and high-end content so that the performance of 
schools that serve low- and/or high-achieving students can adequately 
be measured. This implies that a minimum competency test is unlikely 
to be satisfactory as the basis for measuring school performance. The 
problem with minimum competency exams is that many students 
receive a perfect score year after year. If the tests differ from one grade 
to the next, the recorded gain for these students is totally artificial. If 
the tests do not differ, their recorded gain is zero—in most cases, a vast 
understatement of their true gain in achievement. The simple achieve 
ment models presented later in this paper are not really appropriate for 
tests that exhibit low ceilings and/or high floors. However, the models
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could be extended to allow for the "censoring" of test scores at the high 
and low extremes of the test score distribution.
Critics of standardized tests also argue that conventional multiple 
choice tests are not well suited to assessing skills involving higher 
order thinking and problem solving, the kinds of skills that are increas 
ingly valued in our economy. They argue that the multiple choice for 
mat is generally limited to asking simple questions that have definite 
answers. As a result, a history exam is reduced to questions about dates 
and events, rather than the causes of the Civil War; a mathematics 
exam is reduced to a long series of addition and multiplication prob 
lems, rather than questions involving the application of mathematics to 
solving real-world problems. It is feared that a system of performance 
indicators based on such tests is likely to encourage teachers and 
administrators to focus their teaching on repetitive, rote learning.
These criticisms have stimulated a number of states to begin devel 
oping new, performance-based tests (Dominitz and Meyer 1991). One 
commonplace example of an authentic performance-based test is the 
field portion of a driving test. A driving test assesses, more or less, 
what a driver needs to know to drive on city streets. Indeed, the best 
way to pass a driving test is to practice driving. In contrast, typical 
standardized math tests fail to assess what most students need to know 
about mathematics, the capacity to tackle extended real-world prob 
lems calling for the application of diverse mathematics skills. Advo 
cates of performance-based tests argue that these tests will be 
relatively immune to the phenomenon of narrow teaching to the test 
and more congruent with state educational curriculum goals.
Level Indicators
Standardized student testing is conducted for a variety of different 
reasons: to provide information on individual students and obtain 
aggregate school-level indicators. At the student level, for example, 
standardized test scores may be used to diagnose student strengths and 
weaknesses in subskill areas, 1 to guide teachers in providing instruc 
tion that matches the needs of individual students, to guide students in 
making curriculum and career choices, to determine, in states that have
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minimum competency examinations, whether students are eligible for 
graduation, and to guide postsecondary institutions and employers in 
making admissions and hiring decisions, respectively.
These data, if aggregated to the classroom or school level, yield 
educational indicators that measure, for example, the share of students 
scoring above or below certain thresholds or the average level of 
achievement. I refer generally to statistics of this kind as level indica 
tors. As previously mentioned, level indicators are widely reported by 
schools. Indeed, they are calculated and readily made available by the 
companies that provide testing services to schools throughout the 
nation (Goldman 1990). They are also reported at the national level by 
the National Assessment of Educational Progress. Unfortunately, some 
of the level indicators reported by schools and states are subject to 
obvious statistical flaws. Well-known examples include average SAT 
and ACT scores. The problem with these indicators is that they are 
based on nonrandomly selected groups of students—in particular, 
those students who aspire to attend selective colleges or universities. 
As discussed by Hanushek and Taylor (1990), Powell and Steelman 
(1984), and Wainer (1986), these indicators tend to be highly unreli 
able as measures of the true level of achievement in schools and states. 
In this paper, I limit my analysis to level indicators that are not subject 
to these problems.
If correctly constructed and based on appropriate tests, level indica 
tors convey potentially useful descriptive information concerning the 
proficiency levels of students in particular classrooms or schools. 
Indeed, they could sensibly be used to target assistance (financial or 
otherwise) to schools that serve students with low test scores. The crit 
ical question for the present discussion is whether such indicators are 
valid and useful measures of school or classroom performance. The 
answer to this question is no. School performance indicators, by defini 
tion, must validly measure the contribution of schools to growth in stu 
dent achievement for students in particular grades or sequence of 
grades.
Average (or median test) scores fail to do this for four reasons. First, 
the average test score fails to localize school performance to a specific 
classroom or grade level—the natural unit of accountability in a tradi 
tional school. 2 This lack of localization is, of course, most severe at the 
highest grade levels. In my judgment, a performance indicator that
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fails to localize school performance to a specific grade level or class 
room is likely to be a relatively weak instrument of public accountabil 
ity.
Second, the average test score reflects information that is aggre 
gated across time and grade levels and therefore tends to be grossly 
out of date. For example, consider the average test score for a group of 
high school seniors. The test scores for these students reflect learning 
that occurred in kindergarten, roughly twelve-and-one-half years ear 
lier, through the twelfth grade. Indeed, a twelfth-grade level indicator 
could be dominated by information that is ten or more years old. 3 The 
fact that average test scores reflect out-of-date information severely 
weakens them as instruments of public accountability. In order to allow 
educators to react in a timely and responsible fashion, performance 
indicators must reflect information that is current.
Third, average test scores at the school, district, and state levels tend 
to be highly contaminated due to student mobility in and out of differ 
ent school systems. For example, the typical twelfth-grade student is 
likely to attend several different schools over the period spanning kin 
dergarten through twelfth grade. For this student, a test score reflects 
the contributions of more than one and possibly many different 
schools. The problem of contamination is compounded by the fact that 
rates of student mobility tend to differ dramatically across schools. 
Contamination is apt to be especially high in communities that undergo 
rapid population growth or decline or experience significant changes in 
their occupational and industrial structure. Contamination due to stu 
dent mobility is probably a relatively minor problem at the national 
level, since rates of in- and out-migration are low compared to rates of 
mobility within the nation.
Fourth, the average test score is not a value-added indicator; that is, 
it fails to measure the distinct contribution of a school to growth in 
educational achievement. As a result it absorbs differences across 
schools in student achievement levels that are due not to differences in 
school productivity but rather to variations in student achievement 
prior to entering school and to differences in growth in student 
achievement that are systematically related to differences in student 
and family background characteristics.
In summary, the average test score suffers from four major flaws, 
any one of which could be sufficient to invalidate it as a measure of
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school performance. In the next section I therefore consider an alterna 
tive indicator that largely avoids the problems of nonlocalization, 
aggregation across time and grade levels, and contamination, namely, 
the gain indicator. Immediately following is a series of simulations that 
compare the average test score relative to the gain indicator.
Gain Indicators
The gain indicator measures the average growth (or gain) in 
achievement from one point in time to another for a given cohort of 
students. If students are tested at least once a year, the gain indicator 
largely avoids three of the problems that seriously undermine the aver 
age test score as a valid and up-to-date measure of school performance: 
the problems of nonlocalization, aggregation across time and grade 
levels, and contamination due to student mobility. However, the gain 
indicator does not measure the value-added contribution of schools to 
growth in student achievement, that is, it does not measure school per 
formance. Rather, it measures the joint contributions of students, fami 
lies, communities, and schools to growth in student achievement. As 
such, it is an extremely informative descriptive indicator that should be 
included, along with the value-added indicators introduced below, in a 
comprehensive system of educational indicators.
The quality of the gain indicator depends critically on the frequency 
of student testing. Annual (or more frequent) testing is ideal for several 
reasons. First, performance is localized to single grade levels, the natu 
ral unit of accountability. Second, the information reflected in the indi 
cator is completely up to date. Third, contamination due to student 
mobility is limited only to students who transfer schools during the 
school year.
As the time interval between tests increases, the problems of local 
ization, contamination, and aggregation over time and grade levels 
become more acute. In fact, for time intervals of more than two years, 
it could prove difficult to construct valid and reliable gain indicators 
for schools with high mobility rates. There are two options in such 
cases. First, mobile students could simply be excluded from the data 
for a classroom or school. Dyer, Linn, and Patton (1969) refer to this as
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the "matched sample" approach. The problem with this approach is 
that nonmobile students are apt to be unrepresentative of the school 
population as a whole, both in terms of student characteristics and edu 
cational experiences. Moreover, the number of nonmobile students in 
such cases could be simply too small to yield reliable (statistically pre 
cise) estimates of average student gain. The second option is to include 
mobile students in the gain comparison for a given school even though 
the students obtained part of their schooling from another school. Of 
course, this option is feasible only if mobile students take the same 
tests in different schools and if their test scores are made available to 
the schools to which they move or exit. This clearly would be feasible 
only in states that have mandated state assessment systems. Even so, 
students who move across state lines would be lost unless the states 
happen to use the same state tests and are prepared to exchange student 
test data. A more fundamental problem with this approach is that the 
contamination introduced by mobile students severely jeopardizes the 
validity of the gain indicator if the mobility rate is high. The bottom 
line is that infrequent testing seriously compromises the validity of the 
gain indicator.
How Bad is the Average Test Score as a Measure of School 
Performance? Simulation Results
This section presents a series of simulations designed to assess 
whether the average test score has any value as a measure of educa 
tional productivity. I consider the validity of the average test score for 
comparisons across schools and for comparisons over time for the 
same school. The second type of comparison is particularly relevant 
for the purposes of evaluating the efficacy of school reform efforts.
Let L(c, g) represent the average level of achievement in a particular 
school for cohort c at the end of grade g. Similarly, let G(c, g) represent 
the average gain in achievement in a particular school for cohort c 
from the end of grade (g-1) to grade g, that is,
-l). (1)
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Equation (1) implies that, for a given cohort, the average level of 
achievement at the end of a particular grade, say grade 10, is the sum 
of prior gains in achievement plus the initial average level of achieve 
ment, that is,
L(c, 10) = L(c, 0) + G(c, 1) + ... + G(c, 10). (2)
Given alternative assumptions concerning initial achievement and the 
pattern of gain values over time and across grade levels, I can compute 
the average level of achievement at the end of grade 10 for each 
cohort.
To emphasize the contrast between average achievement and the 
gain in achievement, I assume that average initial achievement and 
average student characteristics are identical for all schools at all points 
in time.4 1 also assume, for simplicity, that all students begin first grade 
at the same age and advance from one grade to the next each year. In 
this case, a unique time index is implied by the cohort and grade, level 
indices. The relationship between time, birth cohort, and grade level is 
given by the formula5
/ = c + g + 6.
To facilitate comparisons across schools at the same grade level, I stan 
dardize the school gain values so that the average gain for the entire 
population at a given point in time is equal to zero at each grade level. 
Average 10th grade achievement is similarly standardized to have 
mean zero. Finally, I assume that the achievement test underlying this 
analysis is scaled so that the standard deviation of school gain values is 
approximately equal to 10 in the typical grade.6 To provide the reader 
with some intuitive sense of the standardized gain values, table 1 lists 
percentile values associated with a range of gain indicator values.
The first pair of simulations illustrate the failure of average test 
scores to localize school performance to specific grade levels. Subse 
quent simulations illustrate the consequences of contamination and 
aggregation across time and grades. Technical details of the simula 
tions are presented in the appendix.
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Table 1. Gain Percentile Values, Given the Assumption that Average
Gains are Normally Distributed
Gain indicator values, given zero Gain percentile values, given the 
mean and standard deviation assumption that average gains are 










The first simulation, as summarized in table 2, contrasts three 
schools that differ in terms of their patterns of (standardized) gain in 
grades one through six and grades seven through ten, respectively. To 
simplify the analysis I assume that these patterns persist over time and 
that there is no student mobility. School 1 exhibits gain values of zero 
(the average) at all grade levels. School 2 exhibits exceptionally high 
gain values in the upper grades and exceptionally low gain values in 
the lower grades. Finally, school 3 exhibits a pattern of gain values that 
is exactly opposite to the pattern exhibited for school 2. As indicated, 
the three schools differ fundamentally in terms of their gain values in 
the early and late grades. Despite these differences, however, the 
schools are indistinguishable in terms of their average level of achieve 
ment at the end of tenth grade. The exceptionally high and the excep 
tionally low gain values simply cancel out for schools 2 and 3.
A similar result is observed in the second simulation, as depicted in 
figure 1. Figure 1 charts the average level of tenth-grade achievement 
over time, prior to and after the implementation of hypothetical aca 
demic reforms in 1992. The academic reforms are assumed to follow 
an era of stable but average gains in achievement at all grade levels. 
Panels A and B in figure 1 depict two different scenarios. In panel A 
the average achievement gains at each grade level increase gradually 
after 1991. In panel B, the average achievement gains also increase
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steadily, but they are limited to grades seven to ten. The gain values are 
indicated on the graph by the solid gray lines. The tenth-grade achieve 
ment levels are indicated on the graph by the solid black lines. As in 
the previous simulation, the two schools differ substantially in terms of 
their gain values at different grade levels. Despite these differences, 
however, there is no perceptible difference between the two schools in 
terms of average tenth-grade achievement. In short, these two simula 
tions demonstrate that average test scores provide no information on 
differences in productivity between different levels of a school system. 
They do, however, suggest that average test scores provide at least a 
rough indication of the productivity of the school system overall. In 
fact, this is generally not true, as is demonstrated below.
Table 2. Average Tenth-Grade Achievement by School, Given 
Alternative Patterns of Gain



























The second set of simulations illustrates the problem of aggregation 
across time and grade levels. These simulations demonstrate vividly 
how average test scores are determined in large part by past gains in 
achievement and hence are apt to be quite misleading as indicators of 
current gains. To highlight the problem of aggregation across time and 
grade levels I assume that achievement gains within a school are iden 
tical at all grade levels and that there is no student mobility. Figure 2 
charts average tenth-grade achievement and average achievement 
gains over time, prior to and after the introduction of hypothetical aca 
demic reforms in 1992. Panel A of figure 2 depicts a scenario in which 
academic reforms reverse a trend of gradual deterioration in average 
achievement gains across all grades and initiate a trend of gradual 




















































































Figure 2. Average Tenth-Grade Achievement Given Alternative Patterns 
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of Figure 2 depicts a scenario in which academic reforms have abso 
lutely no effect on average achievement gains. The reforms, however, 
are preceded by an era of gradual deterioration in average achievement 
gains across all grades, followed by a brief period (1987-1991) of 
gradual improvement across all grades. As indicated in the graph, the 
average tenth-grade test score provides a totally misleading view of the 
effectiveness of the hypothetical academic reforms implemented in 
1992. In panel A, the average 10th grade test score declines for five 
years after the introduction of successful reforms. In panel B, the aver 
age tenth-grade test score increases for a decade after the introduction 
of reforms that have no effect on student achievement growth. These 
results are admittedly somewhat counter intuitive. They arise from the 
fact that 10th grade achievement is the product of gains in achievement 
accumulated over a ten-year period. 7 The noise introduced by this type 
of aggregation is inevitable if school performance is at all variable over 
time. (The interested reader may want to peruse appendix tables A-3 
and A-4. These tables provide additional information concerning the 
two simulations discussed above.)8
The problem of aggregation over time and grade levels also intro 
duces noise into the comparisons of different schools at the same point 
in time. The degree to which noise of this type affects the relative rank 
ing of schools depends on whether the variance over time in average 
achievement growth is large relative to the variance across schools in 
achievement growth. To illustrate this point, figure 3 considers the con 
sequences of aggregation over time and grade levels for two schools 
that are identical in terms of average achievement gains over the long 
term. In the short term, however, average achievement gains are 
assumed to vary cyclically. For school 1, average gains alternate 
between ten years of gradual decline and ten years of gradual recovery. 
For school 2, average gains alternate between ten years of gradual 
improvement and ten years of gradual decline. These patterns are 
depicted in panel B of figure 3. The correct ranking of schools, based 
on average achievement growth, is noted in the graph. Panel A depicts 
the associated levels of average tenth-grade achievement for the two 
schools. The ranking of schools based on this indicator is also noted. 
The striking aspect of figure 3 is that the average tenth-grade test score 
ranks the two schools incorrectly exactly 50 percent of the time. In 
short, the noise introduced by aggregation over time and grade levels is
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Figure 3. Average Tenth-Grade Achievement Given Alternative Cycles of 
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particularly troublesome if one is comparing schools that are roughly 
comparable in terms of long-term average achievement growth. On the 
other hand, this problem is less serious for schools that differ dramati 
cally in terms of long-term average achievement growth. It is also less 
serious if cycles of decline and improvement tend to be perfectly corre 
lated. This seems unlikely as a general rule.
The third and final set of simulations illustrates the possible conse 
quences of contamination due to student mobility. These simulations 
illustrate the extreme sensitivity of average test scores to in-migration 
of students. To highlight the consequences of student mobility I 
assume that achievement gains within a school are identical at all grade 
levels and over time. The first simulation envisions an environment in 
which there are three types of schools that vary in terms of their aver 
age achievement growth. 9 Panel A of table 3 reports the effects on 
average 10th grade achievement of alternative rates of student mobility 
among the three schools. Panel B of table 3 reports the fraction of stu 
dents who change schools, given alternative annual rates of student 
mobility. Notice that student mobility causes average tenth-grade test 
scores to collapse toward zero, the average level. For the high- and 
low-gain schools, for example, an annual mobility rate of 20 percent 
leads to a reduction in average test scores of over 70 percent. In other 
words, the average test score is severely biased against high gain 
schools that happen to serve highly mobile student populations. These 
numbers suggest that average test scores are apt to be highly mislead 
ing indicators of school quality for schools exposed to high rates of 
student mobility. 10
If rates and patterns of student mobility vary over time, average test 
scores are also apt to provide a misleading picture of actual changes in 
school quality over time. This point is illustrated in figure 4, which 
simulates the effects on average tenth-grade achievement of an influx 
of students from a low-quality to a high-quality school system. Events 
of this kind undoubtedly occur frequently throughout the nation as 
school systems merge, communities grow, and the occupational struc 
ture of jobs evolve in a local labor market. Panel A of figure 4 simu 
lates the effects of a gradual influx of students that takes place over a 
ten-year period: 1992-2001. Panel B simulates the effects of an instant 
influx of students in 1992. Despite the fact that average achievement 
growth remains constant after the influx of students, average achieve-
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ment levels decline precipitously following the influx of students under 
either scenario. In the case of the gradual influx of students, the aver 
age level of achievement declines by as much as^SO percent. Moreover, 
average achievement does not return to its 1991 level until the year 
2010. In the case of the instant influx of students, the average level of 
achievement falls instantly by 90 percent and is back to its 1991 level 
within a decade. In short, idiosyncratic shifts in patterns of student 
mobility have the potential to grossly contaminate the average test 
score as an indicator of contemporaneous school performance.
Table 3. Consequences of Student Mobility
A. Average Tenth-Grade Achievement by School, Given Alternative Rates 
of Student Mobility





























B. The Fraction of Students Who Change Schools while in Grades 1 through 10, 

















The simulations presented in this section demonstrate that average 
test scores have the potential to provide a totally misleading portrait of 
educational productivity, both over time and across schools. Indeed, 
the simulations possibly understate the degree to which average test 
scores are flawed as valid measures of school performance since they 
address the problems of nonlocalization, aggregation, and contamina 
tion one at a time, not simultaneously. Fortunately, gain indicators 
largely avoid the three problems investigated in the above simulations. 
Moreover, these indicators are generally easy to compute.
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An Example Based On National Data
The policy significance of the above discussion is aptly illustrated 
using data on average mathematics scores from 1973 to 1986 from the 
National Assessment of Education Progress (NAEP). As indicated in 
panel A of table 4, NAEP scores for eleventh graders exhibit the by- 
now familiar pattern of sharp declines from 1973 to 1982 and then par 
tial recovery between 1982 to 1986. The eleventh-grade data, by them 
selves, are fully consistent with the premise that academic reforms in 
the early and mid-1980s generated substantial gains in academic 
achievement. In fact, an analysis of the data based on gain indicators 
rather than average test scores suggests the opposite conclusion—see 
panel B of table 4. Gain indicators were constructed in panel B by 
computing the change in average test scores over time for given birth 
cohorts." The gain indicators reveal that achievement growth during 
the 1982 and 1986 period was actually no better than achievement 
growth during the prior 1978 to 1982 period. In fact, gains from sev 
enth to eleventh grade were actually slightly lower during the 1982 to 
1986 period than in previous periods! The rise in eleventh-grade math 
scores from 1982 to 1986 apparently stems from an earlier increase in 
achievement growth for that cohort rather than from an increase in 
achievement growth over grades seven to eleven. In short, these data 
provide no support for the notion that high school academic reforms 
generated significant increases in test scores during the mid-1980s. 
These data also vividly confirm the general superiority of gain indica 
tors, relative to level indicators, as measures of educational productiv 
ity.
Value-Added Indicators
As discussed in the previous section, the gain indicator measures the 
joint contribution of students, families, communities, and schools to 
growth in student achievement. The problem is that a school may rate 
highly in terms of a gain indicator primarily or solely because the 
school serves students capable of rapid achievement growth. Unfortu-
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nately, failure to achieve a valid measurement of school performance 
could provide schools with the incentive to improve "measured" per 
formance simply by trying to control the types of students who attend 
their schools.
Table 4. NAEP Mathematics Exam Data___________________
A. Average Test Scores 




219.1 218.6 219.0 





B. Average Test Score Gains
3rd to 7th/9 to 13 
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SOURCE: Dossey et al (1988).
In order to isolate the distinct contribution of a school to growth in 
student achievement, a statistical model must be used. The statistical 
model, if valid, allows one to estimate for each school or classroom the 
expected (or average) gain in achievement that would be realized by a 
given student. In this sense, the model estimates school performance 
controlling for differences across schools in student characteristics and 
perhaps school-level variables such as aggregate student and commu 
nity characteristics. If these characteristics differ significantly across 
schools or classrooms, value-added and gain indicators could differ 
significantly. Dyer, Linn, and Patton (1969), Hanushek (1972), and 
Murnane (1975) were among the first researchers to estimate value- 
added indicators of school performance.
What variables should be included as control variables in a value- 
added model of student achievement and school performance? From 
the perspective of school accountability, it is important to control for 
all factors external to schools, in particular, student and community 
characteristics. Performance with respect to intrinsic school and class 
room factors is what matters. In practice, most school districts have 
ready access to some, but not all, of the student characteristics that are 
likely to determine student achievement: (1) Is a student eligible for a
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free or reduced-price school lunch? (2) Is a student eligible for special 
education services? (3) Does a student's family receive financial assis 
tance from welfare programs? and (4) Is the student classified as being 
at-risk? It is not well known whether these variables adequately control 
for differences across schools in average student characteristics. If not, 
value-added indicators, as implemented, might not fully eliminate the 
distortions (see below) associated with level and, to a lesser extent, 
gain indicators.
The exact relationship between a gain and value-added indicator is 
as follows. For a given cohort at a given grade level, the average gain 
in student achievement G is the sum of two terms: the value-added 
contribution of a school to growth in student achievement P and the 
average contribution of (external) student and community characteris 
tics to growth in student achievement F(X), where X represents a set of 
student and community characteristics, and the function F is estimated 
from an appropriate statistical model of student achievement growth. 12 
Similarly, a level indicator is the sum of three terms: P, F(X), and aver 
age achievement prior to entering a given grade (see above section on 
simulation results). From the perspective of measuring school perfor 
mance, the term F(X) is a source of error in a gain and level indicator. 
Prior average achievement is an additional source of error in a level 
indicator.
The fact that gain and level indicators measure school performance 
with error has important implications for the use of these indicators for 
purposes of school choice and accountability. Because of the contami 
nation due to these errors, level indicators, and to a lesser extent gain 
indicators, are likely to give students the wrong signals about which 
schools to attend. In practice, this means that prospective students, 
both academically advantaged and disadvantaged, could be fooled into 
abandoning an excellent neighborhood school simply because the 
school served students that were disproportionately academically dis 
advantaged. At the other extreme, these indicators could contribute to 
complacency on the part of families whose children attend schools that 
disproportionately serve academically advantaged students. In fact, 
these schools could be adding relatively little to the achievement 
growth of their students. In short, indicators other than the value-added 
performance indicator convey potentially inaccurate information about 
school quality and therefore are likely to distort the school choices of
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students and families. As a result, student achievement is apt to be 
lower than it would otherwise be.
The consequences of using invalid performance indicators for pur 
poses of public accountability are if anything potentially much worse 
than in the case of school choice. This stems from the fact that the indi 
cators used for purposes of public accountability have the potential to 
influence, if not determine, the objectives of teachers and administra 
tors. Indeed, if teachers and administrators are in any way rewarded or 
penalized on the basis of their performance with respect to a given 
indicator, they are likely to respond to these incentives by trying to 
improve their measured performance. In other words, they will have an 
incentive to "teach to the test." More to the point, they will have an 
incentive to "teach to the indicator derived from the test."
This phenomenon is the key to understanding why valid perfor 
mance indicators are potentially capable of generating substantial gen 
uine improvements in school quality. However, it is also the key to 
understanding how statistically invalid indicators could severely dis 
tort the behavior of teachers and administrators. Consider, for example, 
the consequences of using a level indicator to evaluate school perfor 
mance. A level indicator is the sum of school performance and two 
error components that are determined by average student characteris 
tics, average prior achievement, and community characteristics. If this 
indicator is used to evaluate school performance, it provides teachers 
and administrators with the incentive to raise measured school perfor 
mance by teaching only those students who rate highly in terms of 
average student characteristics, average prior achievement, and com 
munity characteristics. In general, these students will be high socioeco- 
nomic status, academically advantaged students. This is the 
phenomenon referred to earlier as "creaming".
The potential for creaming is apt to be particularly strong in envi 
ronments where schools have the authority to admit or reject prospec 
tive students and to expel already enrolled students. However, the 
problem could also exist in more subtle but no less harmful forms. For 
example, schools could: (1) create an environment that is relatively 
inhospitable to academically disadvantaged students, (2) provide 
course offerings that predominantly address the needs of academically 
advantaged students, (3) fail to work aggressively to prevent students 
from dropping out of high school, (4) err on the side of referring "prob-
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lem" students to alternative schools, (5) err on the side of classifying 
students as special education students (if these students are exempted 
from statewide testing), and (6) make it difficult for low-scoring stu 
dents to participate in statewide examinations. These activities are all 
designed to improve average test scores in a school, not by improving 
school quality but by selecting high-scoring students.
As an alternative to trying to select high-scoring students, high- 
quality teachers and administrators could gravitate to neighborhood 
schools that predominantly serve high-scoring students. Hence, using 
the average test score as a high-stakes performance indicator could 
trigger an exodus of highly skilled educators from schools that dispro 
portionately serve academically disadvantaged students.
One final problem with the average test score is that teachers, 
administrators, and the public are apt to correctly perceive it as an 
unfair measure of school performance, thereby undermining the legiti 
macy of the entire indicator system. Indeed, there is some evidence 
that this has occurred in one of the states studied by Dominitz and 
Meyer(1991).
The criticisms discussed above apply equally, although with less 
force, to the gain indicator, since it is subject to a single source of error, 
F(X).
Multiple Dimensions Of Performance
Thus far, I have ignored the fact that schools typically have multiple 
objectives, both academic and nonacademic. Several issues that arise 
in the context of multiple objectives need to be addressed at this point. 
First, it seems likely that an ideal performance indicator system would 
include separate indicators designed to match each and all of the objec 
tives adopted by a school. Such a system would probably include indi 
cators designed to measure school performance in conventional 
academic subjects, possibly mathematics, science, literature, history, 
reading, and writing; but it could also include indicators of school per 
formance in other areas, for example, citizenship, employment readi 
ness, and fine arts. The problem is that it could prove technically 
difficult, burdensome, and expensive to measure outcomes in all of
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these areas. If indicators are available for only a subset of objectives, 
however, it is possible, even likely, that those objectives would effec 
tively dominate all other objectives. This could distort the behavior of 
teachers and administrators by giving them the incentives to devote 
most of their instructional time to the subjects covered by performance 
indicators.
One solution to this dilemma is to measure school performance in 
the areas that are considered to be central to the missions of schools. 
Indeed, there could be advantages to adopting a more limited set of 
educational objectives than currently exists. The adoption of perfor 
mance indicators could conceivably force parents and educators to 
decide what educational objectives are really important.
It seems inevitable, though, that some important educational objec 
tives could be too difficult to measure. If so, one alternative is to mea 
sure the inputs (instructional time and resources) devoted to these 
activities. This could counteract the incentives to limit instruction in 
these activities in order to devote more time to activities that are evalu 
ated. On the other hand, the absence of performance indicators in par 
ticular areas eliminates the opportunity to hold schools accountable for 
their performance in these areas.
Second, it seems likely that some educational objectives could be 
more important than others. How can priorities of this nature be incor 
porated into an indicator system? One possibility is to construct an 
overall performance indicator that reflects the preferences of an indi 
vidual, community, or state. A linear, weighted average of individual 
performance indicators is one particularly simple example of a prefer 
ence function. Such a system has recently been adopted in California 
(Dominitz and Meyer 1991). One potential weakness of the linear pref 
erence function is that it allows high performance in one dimension to 
substitute fully for low performance in another. In fact, most students 
and parents are likely to prefer schools that are very good in many 
dimensions, as opposed to schools that are excellent in some areas, 
poor in others. If so, states and communities could adopt preference 
functions that limit the degree of substitutability between competing 
objectives. Examples of such functions include the Cobb-Douglas and 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functions (Henderson and 
Quandt 1971). This is clearly an area for further research.
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Conclusions and Recommendations
The average test score, one of the most commonly used indicators in 
American education, is highly suspect as an indicator of school perfor 
mance. 13 This indicator suffers from four major deficiencies: it fails to 
localize school performance to the classroom or grade level; it aggre 
gates information on school performance across time and grade levels; 
it is contaminated by student mobility; and it fails to measure the dis 
tinct contribution of schools to growth in student achievement. As a 
result, the average test score is a weak, if not counterproductive, instru 
ment of public accountability. The gain indicator, on the other hand, 
avoids three of the four problems that plague the average test score. As 
such, it is a very useful descriptive indicator. The value-added indica 
tor has the major advantage that it avoids all four of the problems that 
affect level indicators. In particular, it eliminates the incentive for 
schools to cream.
The value-added approach to measuring school performance relies 
on a statistical model to identify the distinct contributions made by 
schools to growth in student achievement. The quality of a value-added 
indicator is determined by four factors: the frequency with which stu 
dents are tested, the quality and appropriateness of the tests that under 
lie the indicators, the adequacy of the control variables included in the 
appropriate statistical models, and the technical quality of the statisti 
cal models used to construct the indicators.
In terms of the first issue, I believe that states need to seriously con 
sider testing students at every grade level, as is currently done in South 
Carolina (Dominitz and Meyer 1991), or at least at every other grade 
level, beginning with kindergarten. Annual testing maximizes account 
ability by localizing school performance to the most natural unit of 
accountability, the grade level or classroom. It also limits the contami 
nation caused by student mobility and yields up-to-date information on 
school performance. Less frequent testing, for example, testing at 
grades kindergarten, four, eight, and twelve, might be acceptable for 
national purposes, since student mobility is not really at issue at the 
national level. 14 For purposes of evaluating local school performance, 
however, the problems created by student mobility argue strongly for 
frequent testing. To limit the costs and burden imposed by frequent stu-
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dent tests, however, it might be sensible to vary the frequency of test 
ing across schools. Annual testing could be implemented only in 
schools or school districts where student mobility is high. In addition, 
annual testing could be implemented in areas with limited enrollments 
in order to improve the reliability of estimates in these areas, and in 
schools with low measured performance in order to monitor these 
schools with greater vigilance.
With respect to the second and third issues, it is important that states 
make it a major priority to collect extensive and reliable information 
on student and family characteristics and to develop state tests that are 
technically sound and fully attuned to their educational goals. Finally, 
further research is needed to assess the sensitivity of estimates of 
school performance indicators to alternative statistical models.
NOTES
1. For diagnostic purposes student test scores are often reported separately by subskill areas.
2. This point also applies to classrooms that serve students in more than one grade and 
ungraded classrooms.
3. This would occur, for example, if the variability over time of school performance is higher 
in elementary school than in middle or high school.
4. This assumption guarantees that differences across schools in average gain reflect differ 
ences in school performance rather than differences in student characteristics.
5. For example, the cohort born in 1980 entered first grade in 1986 and is expected to com 
plete twelfth grade in 1998. Note that the concept of the birth cohort needs to be modified slightly 
to accommodate school districts that require first graders to be six years old prior to beginning 
school.
6. To further facilitate comparisons across schools at the same grade level, gain values could 
be standardized so that the standard deviation is equal to ten for every grade in every year. The 
disadvantage of this approach is that gain indicators constructed in this fashion are not compara 
ble across grades or over time.
7. In the simulations discussed in the text, the average tenth-grade test score is, in fact, exactly 
equal to a ten-year moving average of average achievement gains. This stems from the simple 
assumption that achievement gains are identical at different grade levels in the same year.
8. The appendix tables report achievement gams by grade level and cohort. As indicated in the 
text, achievement gains change from year to year but are always identical across different grade 
levels in the same year. This shows up in appendix tables A-3 and A-4 as gain values that are 
equal on diagonal lines that run from the bottom left to the top right of the tables.
9. Average growth is assumed to be equal to 10, 0, and -10, respectively, in the three types of 
schools. See appendix A for additional details.
10. This conclusion is based on the assumption that at least some student mobility occurs 
across schools of different quality, a reasonable supposition, we think, in the absence of contrary 
data.
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11. NAEP was originally designed to permit this type of analysis. In mathematics, the tests 
have generally been given every four years at grade levels spaced four years apart. For this illus 
trative analysis, I assume that average test scores in 1973 are comparable to the unknown 1974 
scores.
12. For concreteness, consider the following statistical mode of achievement growth for stu 
dents in a given grade:
where i and j index individuals and schools respectively, Y represents growth in student 
achievement, X represents a set of student and community characteristics (indexed by k), a(j) 
represents a school-specific intercept, b represents a set of coefficients (indexed by k), and e 
represents a random error term. The gain indicator for school j is given by G = I Y(i,j)/n(j), where 
n(f) = the number of students in school j. The value-added performance indicator for school j is 
given by P = a(j). The average contribution of external characteristics in school j is given by
F(X)=ZI.b(k)X(i,j,k)/n<j). 
ik
13. Other level indicators, such as the median test score, are similarly suspect.
14. A kindergarten test is needed so that the growth in student achievement in grades one 
through four can be monitored. In our view, the National Assessment of Educational Progress and 
recent proposals for national testing in grades four, eight, and twelve are seriously flawed by their 
failure to include a test at the kindergarten or first-grade level. I suspect that one reason for this 
omission is that both enterprises are insufficiently aware of the flaws of level indicators and insuf 
ficiently aware of the advantages of gain and value-added indicators.

Appendix 
Descriptions Of Reported Simulations
This appendix presents results for the simulations presented in the text. 
Each simulation is defined in terms of the gain in achievement accrued by a 
student at a particular school in a given grade at a given point in time. The 
birth cohort subscript is implied by the grade and time subscripts, as discussed 
in the text. It is given by c = t - g - 6. For simplicity, I assume that students 
begin first grade at age six and advance to subsequent grades one year at a 
time. Gains in achievement are reported by grade and cohort and tenth-grade 
achievement for some of the simulations. Gains in achievement for a given 
year are reported on diagonal lines that run from the bottom left to the top 
right of the tables.
103
104

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Clune, William H. 1991. "Systemic Educational Policy." Wisconsin Center 
For Educational Policy, University of Wisconsin-Madison, July.
Dominitz, Jeff, and Robert H. Meyer. 1991. "Educational Performance Indica 
tors and School Report Cards: Lessons From Three States." University of 
Wisconsin-Madison. Mimeo.
Dossey, John A., et al. 1988. The Mathematics Report Card: Are We Measur 
ing Upl Princeton, N.J.: Educational Testing Services.
Dyer, Henry S., Robert L. Linn, and Michael J. Patton. 1969. "A Comparison 
of Four Methods of Obtaining Discrepancy Measures Based on Observed 
and Predicted School System Means on Achievement Tests," American 
Educational Research Journal 6,4 (November): 591-605.
Goldman, Jay P. 1990. "Grading Schools Through Report Cards: Realtors, 
News Media Collect them For Comparative Purposes," School Administra 
tor 47,6: 26-30.
Hanushek, Eric A. 1972. Education and Race. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath.
Hanushek, Eric A., and Lori Taylor. 1990. "Alternative Assessments of the 
Performance of Schools," Journal of Human Resources 25, 2 (Spring): 
179-201.
Henderson, James M., and Richard E. Quandt. 1971. Microeconomic Theory: 
A Mathematical Approach. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Murnane, Richard J. 1975. The Impact of School Resources on the Learning of 
Inner City Children. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.
Powell, Brian, and Lala Carr Steelman. 1984. "Variations in State SAT Perfor 
mance: Meaningful or Misleading," Harvard Educational Review, 54, no. 
4: 389^12.
Smith, Marshall S., and Jennifer ODay. 1990. "Systemic School Reform." In 
The Politics of Curriculum and Testing. Edited by Susan Fuhrman and 
Betty Malen. 1990 Yearbook of the Politics and Education Association. 
London: Taylor and Francis. Pp. 233-67.
U.S. Department of Education. 1971. America 2000: An Education Strategy.
Wainer, Howard. 1986. "The SAT as a Social Indicator: A Pretty Bad Idea." In 
Drawing Inferences from Self-Selected Samples. Edited by Howard Wainer. 
New York: Springer-Verlag. Pp. 7-22.
109
